21 confirmed as of 12 Mar — each dot = one attack
A drone costs a few hundred dollars. A tanker costs hundreds of millions. This asymmetry has created a reward structure that attracts actors worldwide. On 4 March, an explosion struck a crude tanker anchored approximately 30 nautical miles southeast of Kuwait — operating without direct Iranian instruction. The market is now self-sustaining.
Over 97% of Japan's strategic stockpile is unrefined crude oil. It cannot be used as fuel until processed at a refinery. Directly usable products amount to approximately 4 days.
Refinery lag: METI estimates several weeks to one month between reserve release and fuel reaching consumers. If a refinery shuts down, restart requires weeks to months of repair work.
Mojtaba Khamenei (56) assumed power on 8 March. He has not made a single public appearance since taking office. The IRGC holds effective military and chokepoint authority.
| Public appearances | ZERO | since 28 Feb |
| Statement format | Written only | 12 Mar, read aloud |
| Health status | Unconfirmed | injury reports |
| Military authority | IRGC | no civilian override |
| Ceasefire stance | Full rejection | confirmed 17 Mar |
Why the blockade will not end: Nuclear facilities destroyed. Military capability degraded. Leadership killed. Hormuz is Iran's only remaining leverage. It will not be surrendered.
This is dictated by physics and cannot be changed. Any crude oil, from any origin, yields the same five fractions — but the proportion of each fraction differs fundamentally by crude type.
Japan's refineries have been optimized over decades for medium-sour Middle Eastern crude. Introducing a different crude type degrades processing efficiency and disrupts product yield balance. Reconfiguration takes months or more.
Bars: API gravity (higher = lighter) / Line: sulphur content % (lower = better) · Hover for detail
| Grade · Origin | API | Sulphur | Fit for Japan |
|---|---|---|---|
| ESPO Russia (E. Siberia) | 34.7° | 0.54% | ◎ Optimal. Density match, 1/3 sulphur |
| Arabian Light Saudi Arabia | ~33° | 1.80% | ○ Current primary. Refineries optimized |
| Arabian Heavy Saudi Arabia | ~28° | 2.40% | △ Heavy, high sulphur |
| Murban UAE | 40° | 0.80% | ○ Light, low sulphur |
| WTI US (Texas) | 39° | 0.24% | ✕ Too light. Poor refinery compatibility |
What Hormuz stops: Of the five grades above, all except ESPO transit through Hormuz. 94% of Japan's crude imports halted simultaneously. Only ESPO bypasses Hormuz. Only ESPO is politically blocked.
The most optimistic scenario still requires more than six months to normalization.
Total: six months minimum. With no ceasefire in sight, this calculation is already optimistic. Long-term refinery restart costs — compounded by aging infrastructure — may run hundreds of billions of yen. Those costs are passed to consumers.
Price · transit distance · compositional fit · available volume — no alternative crude satisfies all four simultaneously except ESPO.
ESPO's only barrier is political. Germany continued importing Russian gas for an extended period after 2022. Japan retained its Sakhalin-2 equity stake by the same logic. Yet today's Japan-US summit committed to expanding US oil imports — this is a diplomatic tribute, not an energy solution.
When Hormuz stops, everything else stops with it. Approximately 25% of the world's seaborne oil trade transits this strait — along with LNG (93–96% of Qatar and UAE exports), fertilizer precursors, and petrochemicals.
Japan's Foreign Exchange Fund Special Account holds ¥210 trillion and posted a record surplus of ¥5.36 trillion in FY2024. Statutory provisions for diversion exist, yet not one yen has been directed toward the energy crisis.
The gasoline price support scheme (target ¥170/L, March 2026) follows the same upstream structure. Subsidies are paid through refiners and wholesalers — not directly to consumers. No windfall profit tax exists.
¥10/L subsidy: high-income households receive ¥5,477/year vs. ¥2,607/year for low-income households. Regressive by design.
Regardless of how today's Japan-US summit ends, the following facts do not change.
The reserves exist in quantity. What this crisis has revealed is not a quantity problem — it is a quality and structural problem. Crude type compatibility, refinery lag, and equipment reconfiguration costs combine to render "209 days" a nominal figure only.
The end of the Hormuz era is not a temporary shock. The hardening of the Mojtaba regime, the autonomous escalation of proxies, the emergence of a terrorist market economy — a new world has begun in which the geopolitical risk of Middle Eastern oil is structurally permanent.
The question Japan faces is not "how do we get through this" but "when do we change this structure." COVID did not change it. Ukraine did not change it. If this crisis does not change it, the next one will arrive sooner.